INTRODUCTION
Studies of national systems of innovation (NSI) are often focusing on the R&D system. This chapter will argue that the less conspicuous production and sales/purchase activities are alternative and in many ways more adequate points of departure, also for studying aspects of NSI which are apparently quite distant from this starting point.
More specifically, the claim is that by taking the production and linkage patterns of nations as points of departure a whole set of questions is raised and much can be said about the rates and directions of their innovative activities. Thus something can be said about the probable future state of domestic and foreign firms and the corresponding production and linkage patterns.
The chapter will develop and justify this claim in several steps. First, the basic approach and the analytical elements of the analysis of NSI is sketched (section 2) and the background of the approach is discussed (section 3). Then the two sides of the approach are treated: production structure and "simple" learning (section 4), and linkage structure and interactive learning which includes the special case of development blocks and their structural tensions (section 5). Finally, the limitations of the approach and its possible policy implications are shortly presented (section 6).
THE BASIC APPROACH
Behind the production and linkage approach to NSI is the postulate that most of what is normally classified as "innovation" has a close resemblance to existing products and processes, just like the mutations of biological evolution are overwhelmingly based on the genes of their predecessors. This indicates a degree of continuity in most innovative activities which may allow the formulation of "laws of succession," of course in probabilistic terms and subject to ceteris paribus clauses.
Behind the "laws" are learning, searching and decision-making of firms and (financial, governmental, etc.) organizations which are in many ways bound to the existing specialization and trade patterns. This can most easily be seen at the level of microsearch and microlearning. Here we find first of all that new possibilities are often discovered as more or less unconscious by-products of production and sales activities (learning-byproducing and learning-by-selling and their interaction). Second, more ambitious and conscious searching for and learning about new products and processes are quite often starting with the problems of existing products and processes, which may be conceptualized as two lists of possible demand specifications cumulated since the last shift of product or process: one list containing errors, repair problems and larger breakdowns and another list of ideas and wishes for new features, facilities, performance measures etc.
Such lists (which may only exist in the memory of engineers) are clearly connected to the existing structure of production and of user-producer linkages. Third, even if a new solution with little relationship to national traditions will normally be compared with the existing structures of the firm(s) before it is launched at the market place or in the production process. In many simple and subtle ways the existing traditions are influencing the criteria by means of which the new ideas are judged.
The continuity aspect of innovation may be seen as a result of "bounded rationality" leading to localized search in the space of (technological and marketing) alternatives. Here distance is measured in terms of search costs and increasing uncertainty of the precise characteristics/attributes of alternatives found. What the firm applies as a relatively stable solution will, at best, express a local optimum. A changed competence base may point to better solutions and the same may be found by risky random walks in the space of alternatives. The first kind of shift may be created by new international relationships between firms (e.g., the growth of multinational corporations and networks), the second by gambling and innovative entrepreneurs of the Schumpeterian type I.
This discontinuity aspect of innovation is irreducible and will, of course, not be denied in the argument. However, there is also an aspect of continuity in innovation and it is this aspect which allows us to approach NSI from the production and linkage pattern.
This continuity may help to see the development of the national specialization pattern as something like a Markov process. Whether such a model will ever be fully implemented is quite dubious since it becomes extremely complex even if we stick to quite severe simplifications (e.g., the exclusion of all interindustrial deliveries; only one capital good).
However, let us try to imagine the state of the nationally located firms at period t with respect to, e.g., industry, physical capital, productivity, product characteristics (in industries with heterogeneous products), links to national lead-users, etc. Similarly we may describe the state of the foreign firms. Together with output rules and functions of factor supply and final demand (and if we ignore intermediary products but include a premium for superior characteristics of variants of end-user products) this state determines the firm's competitiveness vis-à-vis its competitors and its profitability. The firm's state in the next period, t + 1, is determined by its (simplified) investment rules and by its search rules (and thus search costs) together with the (assumed) probabilities of finding new process and product variants in the space of alternatives (taking into account the advantages of privileged access to lead-users and, perhaps, to capital suppliers). A newly found alternative will only be included into the new state of the firm provided it is judged to increase productivity or product-variant price.
Provided we accept such kinds of elements in our model-makers' tool-kit, we are imposing upon ourselves a certain conception of NSI. First of all, the name of the game is variety-creation and variety-selection within a given pattern of industrial specialization. The resulting changes in competitiveness may lead to contractions or expansions of industries but not to jumps in the basic industrial structure. We may, of course, give probabilities to firms shifting between industries and to new entrants. But such probabilities are not only small but normally also very uncertain. Second, the search rules of firms and their privileged access to alternatives found by lead-users are basic characteristics of NSI. We are, therefore, urged to look for possible national characteristics of search rules and leaduser access. They may be founded in the overall institutional framework, especially the national idiosyncrasies of financial systems, national interindustrial networks and educational systems. Third, corporate R&D is seen as the outgrowth of less conspicuous search activities (related to general learning and accumulation of knowledge) and it may be discussed in terms of very general search heuristics (cumulative, random, radical, etc. search strategies). The scale and scope of R&D is influenced by national traditions and national systems of taxation. Fourth, the conception of role of public R&D and systems of technology protection and transfer is to a large extent determined by the basic elements of the modelling-kit.
Luckily, the production and linkage approach to NSI does not need to incorporate all these questions from the beginning of the analysis. However, it is still quite demanding concerning data and/or assumptions about, e.g., the structure of the space of possibilities explored by innovative activities and the state of firms (and thus industries and nations) with respect to physical stocks, information channels and behavioural rules Furthermore, the approach implies a special conception of firms, linkages and industries which does not necessarily correspond to wide-spread conceptions and available statistics. The reason is that we relate these concepts to search costs and success probabilities in the space of technological and product characteristics. Thus we are inclined to consider a "firm" as a unit within which search results are immediately spread (which may not be the case in large, multi-divisional corporations). A "linkage" between two firms is defined in terms of information channels providing information of high potential relevance for innovative activities (e.g., items for the lists of "bugs" and "new features"). Such a linkage must fulfil two conditions: it must provide information with minimal search costs and it must relate the firm to a sophisticated firm (a lead-user or lead-supplier).
An "industry" is seen as a taxonomic class incorporating a certain degree of variety of products and processes; but the variants must, in principle, be transferable between the different members (firms) of the class. This also implies a certain similarity of the search spaces of the firms of the industry, although there are major differences with respect to the "distance" to different sources of knowledge. The reader should be aware that the empirical relevance of the whole argument is heavily dependent upon the possibility of defining a level of aggregation and a related taxonomy which are not arbitrary constructs of (national) statistical services but reflect important similarities and differences with respect to production, searching and learning. Even the best available statistics does not remove the necessity of a good deal of distrust concerning its relevance to evolutionary analysis. As already mentioned in ch. 2 the variety of industries is central to evolution but their supposed homogeneity and stability are central to the production of statistics. 1
BACKGROUND OF THE APPROACH
A large series of discussions and modelling exercises can be developed within the broad limits of the production and linkage approach to NSI which has just been sketched. We will soon explore some of these possibilities. However, the problem of the limits and merits of the approach as such may easily disappear in the eternal dilemma of how to chose between realism and simplicity in the analysis of complex social phenomena. When considering the concrete solutions to this dilemma it may not be obvious which analytic decisions are founded in the approach and which are the outcome of other approaches or of random choices. Therefore, it may be helpful to start with some of the backgrounds and typical dilemmas of the approach. This is especially important since the approach may be seen as an attempted resolution of the conflict between structuralist and evolutionary modes of explanation in the analysis of technical or "techno-economic" change. The delicate problems of combining these two modes of thought may easily be forgotten and the concrete articulations of the approach may end up with a purified version of one of the components.
The problems of growth pole analysis
Let us start with an example of the uneasy relationship between evolutionary and 1 Another question concerns "the firms belonging to a national branch of industry." Individual firms may belong to several nations and several and shifting branches of industry. But a large part of them have a relatively stable national and industrial relationship and in much of the argument we concentrate on such cases. Similarly, we suppose that suitable statistics exists or can be provided. But even if the firms belong to the same taxonomic group, they are not necessarily identical in other respects. structuralist approaches: the growth pole theory of Perroux (1953 Perroux ( , 1969 . 2 The idea behind the theory is taken from Schumpeter's (e.g., 1928 , 30 ff) discussion of direct and indirect effects of a radical innovation. A major innovation may be seen as creating the basis for a whole series of more or less adaptive decisions during a shorter or longer epoch of time. Some of these are performed within existing routines while others are innovative, but supposedly of an adaptive and incremental character ("clusters of innovation"). Such sequences of decisions may be captured by the notion of growth poles in the industrial system consisting of propellant industries (the primary, "autonomous" innovators) and impelled industries (showing adaptive response, including "induced" innovation). The development power of a nation is to some extent dependent on the existence of propellant industries within its realm and many national policies can be understood as attempting to monopolize the resultant forces of development. Even if Perroux criticizes the national monopolization of the inducements to develop in some of his works, he is clearly sketching a production and linkage approach to NSI (and to regional systems of innovation).
But this was not clear to all his followers (cf. Brookfield, 1975, 105 ff) . Many of them were not interested in the "laws of succession" but rather in the "laws of coexistence" between the different parts of the industrial system. Here they could use the fact that Perroux was developing his ideas in terms of industries and that he suggested to apply the tools of input-output analysis to the phenomenon of growth poles. They translated the theory into an input-output language with (temporarily) fixed technical coefficients in the following way: large technical coefficients can be taken as proxies for important "linkages" or propelling forces; "industrial complexes" are parts of the industrial system connected by strong "linkages;" the cores of the "industrial complexes" can partly be found by means of the inverted input-output matrix which shows the direct and indirect inputs used for one unit of output of each industry of the industrial system. The policy prescription for development policy was then to invest in important core industries which for one reason or another was not present in the nation under consideration. The rest of the industrial system would then be constructed or renewed by means of the propellant forces from the core industry which was also the core in a NSI.
However, the translation of Perroux's argument is, unfortunately, radically wrong. The tight "linking" of industries revealed by the input-output tables of the most advanced countries has no necessary connection to growth poles. On the contrary, it probably 2 This case is closely connected to the development of the present production and linkage structure approach to NSI, a facts which is only partly reflected in ch. 1 and in Andersen and Lundvall, 1988 . It may be seen as an attempt to combine the linkage-ideas of a family of post-Schumpeterian scholars of development (Perroux, Dahmén and Hirschman) with the theories of learning-by-doingand-using and induced innovation (Arrow, Schmookler, Rosenberg and Lundvall) , the theories of structural transformation (Svennilson, Cornwall and Pasinetti) and Nelson's and Winter's theory of economic evolution. The vision may also be expressed in terms of more recent developments within the theory of innovation and technical change (summarized in, e.g., Dosi et al., 1988; Dosi, 1988) . But still it has many of the characteristics of the Schumpeterian notion of "vision," indicate a "mature" situation with routine deliveries where there are few possibilities of and little impetus to change and development. The "industrial complex" which is found in this way may be like a mature ecosystem where all "niches" is occupied while a growth pole is like a immature ecosystem which is trying to establish itself through rapid evolution. Unfortunately, the latter situation is nearly impossible to catch by means of input-output analysis. The rough tools of absorbing Markov chains appear to be more adequate but, to my knowledge, they were not applied in growth pole analysis.
The sketched formalization of growth pole analysis led to a boom in its application in regional and development economics. But the success was quite short-term because the studies had little to do with change and innovative investment strategies and much more with the interdependence of a well-established industrial system. This led to a neglect of Perroux's concentration on disequilibrium and on the character of the exploration of the space of investment possibilities which constitute the foundations for the whole approach. 3 Furthermore, great problems were created because of the too-ready translation of the search space connected to economic decision-making into a space dominated by geographical or national distances, a translation which clearly neglected Perroux's (1950) original warnings. The boom ended (cf. Brookfield, 1975, 92 f) in "immense confusion", mainly because of a neglect of the fact that "the activity creating a growth pole was essentially a sectoral and geographical disturbance not because of its larger than average size, nor because of its higher multiplier, but because it was [... a radical] innovation."
The most important conclusion of the story of growth pole analysis appears to be the necessity of making very explicit the basic assumptions. The wide-spread non-evolutionary modes of thinking and inappropriate analytical tools may otherwise provide a propensity to drift away from the assumptions and end up in confusion and even non-sensical statements. To avoid this it is important to emphasize the assumptions concerning the aspect of discontinuity in the analysis even if assumptions of a good deal of (probabilistic) "continuity of development" is a necessary precondition for the analysis.
including vagueness and a certain proximity to overall world views. And like other "visions" it is searching for adequate analytical tools for expressing itself. The unrealistic conception of the search space led to serious misconceptions of the policy inplications of the growth pole theory, both in regions and in developing countries. To put the problem sharply: the experience of interdependent and dynamic development based in the steel production of the Ruhr area in the nineteenth century (which was Perroux's paradigmatic example) did not help in providing rapid development in Algeria of the 1960s and 70s (where on of Perroux's students was the chief advisor, cf. Abrahamsson, xx). Neither did the fact that steel production shows large multipliers in the input-output tables of developed economies. The problem of being more than a hundred years too late is not necessarily that there does not emerge as many innovative ideas and possibilities from steel production as before but rather that the "economic niches" suggested for the suppliers and customers of a steel mill are already occupied by well-established firms/industries. Furthermore, there are well-established relationships of the innovative type in the developed countries which are more likely to give ideas for new "niches." Finally, the industry has changed character thereby perhaps making non-formalized contacts less important and easier to establish across national borders than before.
An evolutionary framework
The articulation of basic assumptions are probably not enough to strengthen the evolutionary side of the analysis. Another means is to propose explicit tools for this part of the analysis. Here the basic point of reference is still Nelson&Winter (1982) . That this analysis is central to the present attempt to articulate the production and linkage structure approach to NSI should be clear from the formulations in section 2. But the present upsurge in evolutionary analysis may be so strong that there is a danger on a "crowding out" of the structuralist aspects of the analysis in much the same way that the evolutionary aspects were removed from growth pole analysis. Actually, we will see that the attempt to Nelson&Winter's aim is to treat the totality of the process of economic evolution including the mechanism of transmission (in terms of routine behaviour), the mechanism of variety-creation (in terms of search for routines which are new to the firm) and the selection mechanism (in terms of dynamic market processes or "Schumpeterian competition").
Their book covers a verbal analysis of these mechanisms as well as a series of specialized models and simulations which incorporate and study different versions of the mechanisms.
One of the central models deals with an industry with a homogeneous product but with the possibility of different and changing production routines in different firms. The development path of the industry is described in terms of a Markov process. (1978 cf. Gerybadze, 1982, 129) .
The computational steps of the figure describes how the state of the industry in the next period is found. This involves first a simplified economic process in the industry whereby the output, price, profits and financial constraints of firms are found by taking into account the given cost and demand conditions, the capacity utilization rules of firms and the behavioural rules of banks.
Second, there is a process whereby new production techniques are found. In the particular model firms are always involved in search for new production techniques and their search costs are defined by fixed relationships to their capital stock. In the imitative type of search the firm may be lucky to get access to the present best-practice routine of the industry. In innovative search things are more complicated. Here the firm explores a space of possible production routines which are defined in terms of capital productivity. 5 The 4 Figure 4 .1 does not describe the constants of the model, including the exogneous cost and market conditions, firms's capacity utilization rules, behavioural rules of banks, the disembodied character of technical change, the structure of the search space in terms of search costs and productivity of (probabilistic) search results.
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In other models labour productivity is also taken into account.
probability to have a result is dependent on search costs. In the "cumulative technology" version the productivity of a result (a "draw") is most likely to be near to the present technology (localized search) while it is only dependent on exogeneous factors in the "science-based" case. When the search of the period is over, the firm decides which routine to use: the one inherited from last period or the results of the imitative or innovative search. If the routine is changed, the results will influence total productivity of the next period (disembodied technical change).
Third, we have the investment decision. Desired investment depends on the relation between price and unit costs with the improved technology compared with a target mark-up factor. Actual investment must be between zero and the financial constraint. Together with the stock inherited from previous periods (minus depreciation) we now have the capital stock of the next period. This evolutionary model is just an example since "a vast array of particular models can be constructed within the broad limits of the theoretical schema" (p. 19) Therefore, we should not be constrained by their concrete model specifications but should see that "the analytical vantage point of an evolutionary theory reveals things from a different angle.
After one gets used to that viewpoint, it turns out that much of what is seen is familiar.
However, previously unnoticed features of the familiar objects become apparent" (p. 414) To what extent this is the case with respect to NSI is, of course, what concerns us in the present context together with the question of which aspects of NSI the framework is pushing into obscurity. These questions will be dealt with in the following.
Growth poles in the evolutionary framework
At present we will see the model of figure 4.1. as a paradigmatic example of evolutionary analysis and ask to which extent it allows the inclusion of a richer structural set-up. Can it, e.g., help to formalize the evolutionary aspects of growth pole analysis which were "crowded out" by too much structure and determinism?
The immediate answer to this question is negative. Nelson&Winter's "laws of succession" make the paths followed by individual firms interdependent for two simple reasons. First, total output of the industry determines price which determines profitability which, in turn, is one of the factors determining investment. Second, the firm may imitate the best-practice routine found in the industry in a given period. But in growth pole theory firms are influencing each other in many other ways: a special emphasis is put on "vertical" supplier-producer relationships rather than intraindustrial relationships, new products are considered just as well as new processes, etc. Thus the types of relationships covered by Nelson&Winter and Perroux are quite far from each other.
But at a deeper level there are much more similarity. To see this we need to sketch a modified version of the Nelson&Winter model. Let industry C be the one which supply the capital goods for industry D, the one described in the Nelson&Winter model. The disembodied change of the routines of industry D has already been described. But let us assume that the capital stock puts limits to the radicality of change of production routines.
However, new types of physical capital allow using these routines. Thus, the innovative Dfirms will have the possibility of creating a "list" of routines which are not feasible in the present period. The existence of such "lists" would radically ease the search conditions of the C-firms but at the same time the equal access to the "lists" would delimit their relevance for creating competitive advantages for specific firms.
However, the "lists" does not exist in practice because they are difficult to establish and involve a lot of tacit knowledge. But if there is a well-established "linkage" between two firms belonging to different industries, there is a large probability that the C-firm will find out about non-feasible routines of industry D. If the C-firm is also active in search for new product-variants, there is a some probability that it will discover a machine-type which makes the D-routine feasible. When presented to them, the new machine will be acknowledged by D-firms as having superior characteristics and worth a higher price than ordinary machines.
However, why should D-firms allow the search in their factories for non-feasible routines? If the question should be answered in isolation and if the machine became immediately available to all D-firms, there would be no reason for helping C-firms. But Cfirms may be asked whether a new routine can be performed in connection to existing machines and they may be involved in modifying existing machines. Furthermore, a new C-product is normally produced at a small scale in the beginning and the "linked" Dfirm(s) may benefit from early access to the new machines. From a modelling viewpoint these practices are worrying since they greatly complicate the tasks (not only of introducing different vintages of capital but also of creating limited access to the very last machine-type). But in principle they belong to the Nelson&Winter framework.
With respect to growth pole analysis the discussion of the interplay between C-and D-firms is illuminating. Here is nothing of the automatic mechanisms of input-output analysis but an unbalanced interface between two industries. If industry D represents the core of the growth pole, there will be a rapid exploration of the space of production routines and a lot of non-feasible ideas. In such a situation we may find zero or even negative search costs in industry C because D-firms become involved in machine development and propose new specifications for selected C-firms and are also involved in the rapid debugging of the new C-products. Actually, the D-firms may chose to become involved in C-production but this case will not be discussed here.
The analysis of interfirm and interindustrial relationships are only covering a small aspect of the possible couplings encountered in growth pole literature but it may suffice to show how evolutionary analysis clear out an elementary unit of the functioning of the growth pole. The growth pole must be understood in terms of series or cascades of this and similar units.
Problems with structures
An important difference between evolutionary and structuralist approaches seems to be the different ways in which they treat "structures," like, e.g., market structures or national specialization structures. The structuralists are treating them as structures, i.e., relatively stable phenomena which may help to explain more flexible phenomena. The evolutionists (and neoclassical economists) are often treating the "structures" as relatively flexible patterns to be explained by other factors. Thus, the two approaches are often missing each others points since what is considered to be the explanandum by the one party is the explanans of the other party, and vice versa. This fundamental difference may help us to understand why the two components of, e.g., growth pole analysis behave like a mix of oil and water.
In this debate we strangely see an arch-evolutionist like Schumpeter in the camp of the structuralists. The reason it that he (1942) presented a self-critical argument which has later been presented as the "Schumpeter hypothesis" of the superior innovative abilities of large corporations. This crude argument, which may more appropriately be claimed to be the "Galbraith hypothesis," has created a huge literature (reviewed in Kamien and Schwarz, 19xx) . But to an evolutionary approach the argument seems to be wrongly put: the market structure is rather a result than a cause of technological development. This point was developed by Nelson&Winter (e.g., ch. 14) in a series of simulation experiments using the model of figure 4.1. In their analysis concentration patterns are superstructures reflecting the underlying base structures of, e.g., general behavioural routines and the structure of the search space. But they admit that the causation may also take the opposite direction.
A similar controversy has developed over the national specialization structures. Here there is a long-standing tradition to explain the specialization pattern of a nation('s firms) by the factor endowments of this nation. The underlying assumption appears to be that the specialization pattern is relatively flexible while the factor endowments and other explanatory variables are longer-term characteristics of nations. This assumption has not been unchallenged. Different kinds of "structuralists" (e.g., of the Latin American brand) have argued that the specialization pattern of a nation is in reality a rather inflexible structure, at least in the weakly developed areas. With respect to such areas the specialization structure is a major explanation for the factor endowments and for the (poor) overall economic performance. However, other economists have moved in the same direction but within the traditional framework: Parts of the specialization pattern may be explained by other parts of the specialization pattern which is supposed to reflect special factor endowments. In the same view one can probably argue that the existence of a growth pole-core within a nation is an asset which explains other parts of the specialization pattern.
But also national R&D and education systems may be considered as being more readily available for local firms that for foreign firms. The former obtain competitive advantages by utilizing these opportunities just as when they utilize other abundant factors of production.
In figure 4.2. the discussion over the specialization structure of two nations, the "domestic" economy A and the "foreign" economy B, is sketched in an evolutionary style. The basic line of the evolutionary argument would start from the behavioural rules and the search conditions via the actual technological development of the industries (e.g., C and D) to the specialization pattern as reflected in some measure of concentration like, e.g., Balassa's export specialization figures (see part III). But we will show below that the specialization structure may also be taken at the starting point of the analysis which determines the actual technological development and even influences the behavioural rules of the industries. Even certain aspects of the search space is influenced by specialization but this relation will has to await until further discussions. Even if the main impression of the structure-performance controversies is quite confusing, one should not jump to the conclusion that one should drop any kind of equivalence classes ("industries," "commodities," etc.) in economic arguments and stick to the basic actors. The same type of argument would lead to the abandoning of the species concept in biology. Instead, we should try to give an evolutionary explanation of the existence of the structures which are not artifacts of statistical offices. These real structures which are partly reflected in the national specialization pattern is influenced by the choices of the economic agents but at the same time there is a great deal of path-dependency and lock-in-ness. In other words, the specialization pattern may at a few points of time be in a flux but often the Markov process results in a relatively stable specialization index because there are certain "absorbing states" in the state space.
PRODUCTION STRUCTURE AND "SIMPLE" LEARNING AND R&D
We will start by a simple exploration of how the production pattern of a nation may influence the long-term behaviour of the central variables of the national economic system (technical change, competitiveness, employment, GPD per capita, etc.). This version of the "structural" explanation of national competitiveness will be followed by other versions of of the theme that "production and linkage patterns matters." In all the cases a main purpose is so make explicit some of the propositions about innovation and international specialization which appear to be underlying the "structural thesis." The result is a whole series of propositions which are intended to provoke two types of reactions. First, the propositions should be criticized and refined. Second, they may heuristically be taken as a preliminary set of assumptions for empirical studies and model-building exercises related to the production and linkage structure approach to NSI. The propositions are mainly formulated at the industry level while the underlying dynamics is studied in terms of the heterogeneous firms of the industry. The full resolution of the dilemma is left for future studies.
Learning as the outcome of production of a given industry
There is a tendency of the system of routines to become hierarchisized so that changes of routines take place within the framework of unchanging metaroutines. One basic metaroutine may here be formulated as "cobbler, stick to your last," to your industry. This allows for more restricted kinds of innovations. Once in a while there is even a break-up of an apparently irreversible absorption into a certain state in the state space (a radical innovation of the Schumpeterian type) but we have more to say about the process following such a radical innovation (see section 5). In any case we emphasize the differentiation of the broad business term of "innovation" so that certain searching and learning activities are seen as leading to "incremental innovations" within the framework defined by a more or less "radical innovation."
The structural conservatism which is reflected in a stable specialization pattern is not only founded in the acknowledgement by the economic actors of their own bounded rationality but also in more binding reasons for path-dependency and lock-in-ness. A simple version of this self-reinforcing specialization takes its starting point in Arrow who in a classical paper (1962) brought into focus the idea of "dynamic economies of scale" or "learning-by-doing." 6 It was his basic hypothesis "that technical change in general can 6 This was based in economic studies of the 1950s but it was not without reference to evolutionary ideas. According to Arrow's own account (1983-85, 157 ) "the idea that faculties and abilities develop by use is a very old one in biology [Lamarck] and psychology. The term "learning by doing" was intended to remind the readers of the doctrines of John Dewey and other leaders of progressive education in the 1930s and earlier." These inspirations was formulated in extreme be ascribed to experience, and that it is the very activity of production which gives rise to problems for which favourable responses are selected over time." The cumulated results of experience may thus represent major barriers against shifting from one field of specialization to another where the beginner will start at a lower level of productivity than the established firms.
In Arrow's formulations we find the elements of a theory of minor innovations ("favourable responses") related to "problems" of production which may help to explain the rate and direction of an important part of the innovative activities within NSI. This theory seems to summarize a good deal of industrial experience on the gradual "debugging" of, e.g., complex computer programs or chemical plants. Even if one is facing a plant delivered on a "turn key" contract, the production as well as procurement and sales are seldom fully routinized; labour and management as well as sales-people and users of products are gradually encountering and solving many difficulties, faults, limitations and bottle-necks. In short, they are learning about problems and solutions, thereby being able to increase productivity and product quality. The pure example of such a learning process was given by the Horndal steel-mill which for two decades had a yearly increase in labour productivity (nearly 2% p.a.) without any investments (Lundberg, 1961, 130 ff). However, one should note that many studies show rapid decreases in the learning effects of a given line of productive activity; it is structural changes and investment in new machines which secures a continued recreation of the conditions for high rates of learning.
There are good reason to believe that industries differ with respect to the "natural trajectories" of learning and minor innovation (Nelson&Winter, 258 ff). Furthermore, it should be noted that, according to the assumptions of behavioural economics, short-term pressures on the economic actors are central to the transformation of learning possibilities into technical change. And these pressures may differ markedly between nations (Tylecote and Demirag, 1991) . Under such conditions a specialization pattern becomes, at best, a local optimum for the decision makers and even if they would be better off when placed in another pattern they can/will not perform the intermediate steps which would create this pattern. In principle, this difficulty may be overcome with the help of a highly developed financial system. In the practice of bounded rationality it represents a major determinant of historicity and hysteresis in the specialization of nations. Once the specialization pattern is fixed an "evolutionary stable strategy" of the firms belonging to a national branch of industry may be possible. It includes the product and process changes which are able to uphold their aggregate competitive performance measured in terms of their share of the specific international market or of the global value added or of the global profits. 7 But once brevity and not developed in Arrow's formal growth model. It is, however, such short formulations which have inspired a number of subsequent studies.
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To avoid tautological "explanation" into which evolutionary explanations may sometimes degenerate ("the national branch has a high competitiveness because it has a high competitive in a while radically different "windows of opportunity" open up and basic shifts in the specialization pattern may occur.
These ideas may be summarized and developed at two levels: first, in terms of homogeneous industry aggregates and second, in terms of industries consisting of explicitly heterogeneous firms. The first level may be expressed in terms of the following propositions:
(a) The specialization pattern of a nation is relatively stable. Large parts of it are stable for decades, but once in a while "jumps" (i.e., relatively rapid changes) take place. (b) The relative stability does not exclude and is actually dependent upon trajectories of learning and minor innovations which reflect the gradual evolution within the given framework of specialization. (c) There are major differences in the possibilities of learning and minor innovations between different industries in a given period of time. These differences may sometimes be described in terms of industries which have to different degrees "moved down the learning curve" or reached different "stages of the product life cycle;" but they may also be due to more global changes in technology and demand etc. (d) The learning and innovation effects of different specialization patterns are important determinants for the differences in overall competitiveness of nations (e.g., measured in terms of the balance-of-payments-equilibrium growth rate).
These propositions are closely related to each other. The stability of the specialization structure (a) is largely dependent upon static and especially dynamic economies of scale (learning-by-doing, etc.) (b). The relevance of this stability for the effects of the specialization pattern on national performance is partly due to the differences between branches with respect to learning and minor innovations (c). Nations with similar propensities to transform learning possibilities into technical change will show differences in productivity performance due to differences in the specialization structure. Whether these differences will influence profitability and industry growth depends on, e.g., elasticities of demand and supply. Thus proposition (d) needs further specification: a learning-enhancing specialization structure cannot be exploited and upheld in the long run unless the institutional set-up of the nation is appropriate for this purpose (see ch 2).
The evolutionary foundations of learning-by-doing
The modelling exercises of Nelson&Winter (1982) concentrate on a single industry performance"), it is important to emphasize that we explain the competitive performance by means of price and/or quality characteristics which may in turn be explained by phenomena further back in the chain of causation. Here we may encounter the results of past competitive performance but such sequential explanation does not necessarily imply tautology.
consisting of explicitly heterogeneous firms. While these firms are producing a homogeneous product they are searching for production routines of higher productivity that the ones they use in the present period. As mentioned in ch. 2 "searching" may be considered as a special case of "learning" which is especially demanding with respect to social interaction. However, in the present context it is more convenient to consider "searching" as one aspect intrinsic in all "learning activities" while memorizing represents another aspect. In the simple but classical learning experiments we have first the search in a space of alternatives, then the reinforcement of a specific behaviour by different kinds of rewards. This method of trial-and-error (or rather trial-and-success) is firmly built into Nelson&Winter's framework and its formulation in probabilistic terms should not conceal its close relationship to Arrow's ideas (which are formalized in terms of deterministic equations). One may simply argue that Arrow is operating at a much higher level of aggregation than Nelson&Winter. But the latters' look at the microfoundations of production-near aspects of NSI brings forward a whole set of questions which are not reflected by Arrow's growth story and model.
There is another reason why many have overlooked the close but difficult relationship between Arrow's "learning-by-doing" and Nelson&Winter's "search" for new and better routines. The reason is that Nelson&Winter, by following the behavioural school, takes serious the problem of routine-transmission. Thus they (pp. 99 ff) must deal with the conservative aspects of learning and remembering by, e.g., talking of "remembering-by-doing" as the major way in which firms preserve their routines. From this starting point the change of routines becomes a problem to be studied rather than the more or less automatic outcome of (creative) practice in the sense of Dewey and Arrow. In this vein Nelson&Winter (p. 258) prefer studies which "do not treat learning as somehow an inevitable and uninfluenceable consequence of doing. Rather, learning is viewed more actively, and it is apparent that resources can be applied to learning." To emphasize this point, the search aspect of the learning activities are called R&D and treated as a separate activity of firms which may be expanded (or contracted) independently of production activities. But it should be underlined that "R&D" is just a name used by Nelson&Winter for activities whereby a firm may (intentionally or unintentionally) get access to new productive routines. Real R&D activities are primarily treated in terms of a "science-based industry" while more learning-like "R&D" activities are treated in a "cumulative technology" case.
In a "slightly" modified form Nelson&Winter's analysis of the evolution of a single industry may illuminate some issues concerning NSI. The primary modifications are to subdivide the firms of the industry into a national and a foreign subset, to assume that the two "economies" are equal with respect to, e.g., factor endowments, and to assume that the industry is only of marginal importance to the overall economic process of both "economies" (in order to avoid some of the complexities of international economics). In such a context we may discuss and study how differences in R&D spending rules, financial evaluation methods of innovative projects (including pay-back periods), possibilities of imitation (including different modes of enforcing patent regulations and nationally bounded industry-pools of knowledge) will influence competitiveness and investment in the long run. Such characteristics of NSI are clearly important (and will be treated in subsequent chapters) but still they miss some of the core concerns of the present book.
But the "slight" modification of the Nelson&Winter framework points to a question of more general interest to the present argument: the "topography" of the search space and perhaps even the selection space. The first term is used as a metaphor to suggest the conditions under which the search for new routines takes place. "The topography of innovation determines what possibilities can be seen from what vantage points, how hard it is to get from one spot in the space of possibilities to another, and so forth." (p. 229) We have actually included one or more new dimensions into this landscape to the extent that the search involves contacts and information flows across the national border. This is especially clear when we talk of imitation and selection but even in the case of innovation search will often have to consider the economic, geographical and cultural dimensions of space discussed in ch. 3.
Actually, we find out that even the organizational dimensions of space is nearly absent in the argument of Nelson&Winter except in the discussions of imitation. But even in this case all firms are equally near or far from each other. This idea may be a relevant abstraction in many discussions but it is quite far from the visions behind the present argument and it even represents a radical delimitation of the concept of "locality" in the argument of Nelson&Winter which is especially clear if the search and selection spaces are taken together. To use another metaphor: there are no "Galapagos Islands" in their topography and thus no chance of developing and testing new variants under specialized conditions before they are tested in the more hostile environment at the mainland.
The task of the topography of Nelson&Winter is much more modest. It is mainly described in terms of total productivity created by productive routines and emphasize the distance and search costs involved in obtaining new routines. In this context the production routine of a firm is upheld until it finds a more productive routine. If the firm is following the metaroutine of satisficing conservatism, it will not search for new routines unless its profitability falls beneath a certain level. The rationality of this behaviour is founded in the assumption that only "localized" search (and thus minor productivity gains) is likely to be successful while at the same time this search (and the implementation of its results) is still costly and uncertain. This specification of firm behaviour may be challenged and the firm may be seen as performing a permanent and production-near search (and learning), but this alternative view only underlines the "localized" character of the activity and thus the very small probability of great jumps of productive performance. However, if the firm finds a new and more productive routine, it still increases its competitiveness within the given selection environment, profitability is increasing and there is a possibility for increasing its production capacity and market share.
When describing the evolutionary path of the firms of a given nationally located industry, it is important to note that this path is not only dependent on the adaption of a global fund of knowledge. The competitiveness is also dependent upon a good deal of "localized" learning, innovation and diffusion of knowledge (cf. figure 4.2.) . By "localized" we mean national and more or less industry specific. This is so both when the national industry is following an evolutionary stable strategy and when we see changes in its "revealed competitiveness" (its market share, etc.). This kind of localized search may help to conserve national idiosyncrasies in the pattern of specialization. In this case we are not dealing with a global lock-in-ness into a specific technology (as discussed by David and Arthur) but with a lock-in of national firms/industries due to, e.g., asset specificity and the difficulties of entering well-established industries where especially a huge amount of tacit knowledge becomes a major barrier to entry. The empirical arguments can be found in disaggregate studies of trade specialization of industrialized nations as it is revealed in the OECD trade-by-commodities statistics (see ch. 11).
Back to industry-level analysis
The analysis may reveal new problems if it is expanded to cover many industries and not only a single one. Here we will mainly talk in terms of industry aggregates rather than collections of individual firms. At this level of analysis we may say that even if two industries have the same overall rate of growth, one may be characterized by big productivity increases while we only see small effects in the other. This observation may partly be described in terms of different degrees of sectoral "maturity" with respect to production and products. The degree of maturity cannot be discussed solely in terms of the "life cycles" of the industries since there are clear natural and technological differences with respect to problem-solving. There is an old tradition among economists of pointing out that possibilities of productivity growth is more difficult in some industries than in other industries. Such cases are discussed in the literature on dynamic causes of increasing returns to scale.
But there are many other factors which determine the amount of new problems and "favourable responses" created by a given rate of growth. Productivity change takes place in each industry both as a function of investment and as a function of learning-by-doing within the branch and disembodied transfer of knowledge from other branches (and other knowledge sources). Even under such conditions there are good reasons to believe that there are major differences in learning capabilities between different industries of the economy. In some industries output change lead to much learning and big productivity increases, in others we will only see small effects. But even if the possibilities of learning and productivity gains were evenly distributed among industries, actual production-dependent learning would differ between branches because of differing income elasticities of demand (and the inflexible response to establish new industries). In other words, an increasing world income is divided non-proportionally among the different product categories and, therefore, we have an additional reason why branches have different possibilities of learning and productivity growth (cf. Pasinetti, 1981; Thirlwall, 1986) .
LINKAGE STRUCTURE AND INTERACTIVE SEARCHING AND LEARNING

On the structural character of some interfirm relationships
The linkage aspect of the production and linkage approach to NSI is closer to the underlying vision than the production and learning-by-doing aspect. Here we emphasize that the economy of a nation can also be seen as a network of interfirm/interindustry relationships, i.e. the flows of commodities, labour and information knitting the system together. Thus the question of why the network is relatively stable becomes crucial to us. Is it really appropriate to label part of this network the linkage "structure"? If so, have the relatively stable parts of the network any relevance to innovation? Such questions are especially important since many analysts are not accoustomed to focus on such questions.
On the contrary, they either deny the structural character of producer-customer relationships or focus on innovations which have little to do with them. Neoclassical analysis normally presupposes an extreme degree of flexibility in the relationships of the economic system, and therefore exchange relations are not a part of the "structure" of the system. Even Hirschman (1958 Hirschman ( , 1987 who created much of the interest in "linkages" would probably refuse to talk of the structure of forward and backward linkages.
Nelson&Winter are primarily discussing routines and routine-creation internal to the firm and not bound to interfirm relationships. The idea may rather be seen as a special case of Williamson's transaction cost analysis but he has not developed much interest in the problems of technological development. So, there appear to be a need of explaining the idea and explicit the underlying propositions and theories on the structural aspects of the network of interconnections.
The neglect of the structural character of some interfirm relationships is closely connected to the neglect of product innovation in most of the theoretical literature. The flexibility of the interfirm network presupposes the exchange of standard products which may, according to an old tradition of generalizing from primary products, be called commodities. The underlying assumption, which is seldom formulated explicitly, may understood as defining an "ideal type" of interface between the producer and user of a commodity (Andersen, 1991) . We may call it an interface constructed according to the principle of commodity abstraction. This principle may be discussed in relation to the model of the interaction between machine producers of industry C and machine users of industry D (section 3.3.).
The disequilibrized interface, where a lot of product innovation may take place in the machine-producing C-firms if they get access to the problems and ideas of their customers, is not ideal from many points of view. Especially, we see that a lot of information is needed to deal with new machines and with their diffusion to competitors and customers. Much of this information burden may be avoided by using the principle of commodity abstraction.
According to this principle standardized and information poor seller-buyer relationships should be constructed in order to delimit the information burden put upon the parties. The buyer of a product should be able to consider the product as a "commodity" which lives up to well-defined standards and has a well-defined price. The advantage is that the necessary knowledge is diminished and thus the buyer is helped to avoid running into a complexity limit (Hayek, 1948) . Similarly, the seller can avoid the need for impossible amounts of knowledge as long as he accepts the interface specification. For example, he does not need to know anything about the buyer if he wants to change his production process-as long as he does not change the interface. This principle is clearly pointing at an ideal state which can only be reached approximately in real life.
If interfirm relationships are designed according to this principle, they become quite flexible. What is inflexible and routine-like is the interface specification. Actually we may easily see a lock-in into such an interface because of a kind of vicious circle. The more the principle of commodity abstraction is followed, the less information it transferred between producers and users, and the more difficult it becomes to redesign the interface. In the extreme case the two parties are separated by a complex system of traders who function as an nearly impenetrable information filter.
But this stability may once in a while come under serious pressure. Let us say that the D-firms become connected to a growth pole but at the same time have developed a fixed interface vis-à-vis the C-firms. They find themselves faced with a rapid expansion of their production and they are generating much new knowledge about possible routines which are not feasible because of the existing machine-types. Maybe they are even induced to develop their own machine production. But there is an alternative. That is to uphold a certain ability of changing interfaces, even in the relatively stable periods. In other words, the firms are to a large extent engaged in the fixed type of interface but they are at the same time upholding some interfaces which are organized according to the principle of interactive learning in product innovation. According to this "ideal type" principle informal and information rich seller-buyer relationships should be developed because they are necessary in the development of a losely defined "proto-commodity" and in the beginning of its possible transformation into a well-defined "commodity" through a process of "commodification." This principle in necessary in the evolution of new products and branches. And some products may even stay in their unfinished and information-rich form. But the related kinds of relationships between sellers and buyers put a heavy information burden upon both parties and makes necessary frequent negotiations which are quite complex, especially because one seller has many buyers and thus confronted with one-to-many or many-to-many relations.
It is important to understand that both principles are presupposed by the linkage approach to NSI. In a way the first principle is the rule while the second principle is the exception. The first principle is necessary for mass-production but also for all kinds of decision-making in a complex economy. The second is necessary for creating products which are first constructed according to lose buyer specifications and according to the "principle of the available nails" on the producer's side. Later the product (as well as the related processes of production and consumption) undergoes a process of debugging and routinization. It is in these early steps of the process of "commodification" that we argue that intranational relationships between firms/branches (and final customers) have their special role to play (see below).
Propositions on linkages and learning
The idea of product innovation by means of interactive learning may be seen as a generalization of Arrow's (1962) analysis of learning-by-doing to deal with the problem of product innovation. In this case learning-by-doing is really learning-by-using new products (ch. 3; Lundvall, 1985; Rosenberg, 1982, ch. 6) . One could also speak of a kind of knowledge accumulation founded in the trials and errors connected to the use of the product. In the case of computer programs such knowledge accumulation will often take the form of a list of faults and major problems ("bugs") and another list of new facilities which may be important to the user. This learning and knowledge accumulation is (to a large extent) located in the using branch and some of its results can be implemented without changing the machinery or the programs (disembodied technical change). Other results concern the improvement of machinery/programs. If we presuppose a strict division of labour, such ideas cannot be implemented without a product development in the machine producing branches or in the programming houses. These branches are, furthermore, the main supplier of knowledge about the technological possibilities for such improvements.
There is thus a clear need for informal or semi-formal relationships and, therefore, the interface between the two parties cannot be fully frozen and we will find linkage-effects which are not fully accounted for by the economic exchanges of commodities and money, not even if we include commodified information. This way of looking at interfirm relations is to some extent developed by Arrow himself. To him (1973, 147) "the whole idea of a firm with definite boundaries cannot be maintained intact. For example, the customers of a firm are, to some extent, part of it ... There are direct information flows from customers in the form of complaints, requests for product alteration or special services, or threats to change to another firm, in addition to the anonymous alterations of demand at a given price which constitute the sole information link between a firm and its market in neoclassical theory. Some employees of a firm will have closer links to customers than to at least some of the other employees."
It is well-known that such a state of floating limits between firms/industries is not necessarily permanent. Sometimes limits may be "frozen" according to the principle of commodity abstraction. Furthermore, the possibility of establishing and retaining the information-rich "interfaces" between firms/industries may especially be found when we speak of intranational relationships.
One of the reasons is that it is more easy to organize nationally these kinds of informal but contract-like relationships which presupposes a certain degree of "reciprocity as a condition for continuing with the relationship" (Nelson, 1987, 80) . The problem is of course, how to agree upon and secure "reciprocity" in extremely informal matters and here the closer-knit network and the cultural norms of the nation may help. Thus the innovative relationship between two firms/industries should not only be described in terms of "interdependent learning" or "learning-by-interacting." We should also emphasize that the crucial learning results may take the form of tacit knowledge which is only brought into a more precise form through the interaction of the two firms/industries. This is a major reason for national processes of interactive learning (see ch. 3).
In the present context it will be argued that the structural character of interindustrial relationships is related to transfer of learning results and their relevance for innovation.
This implies a set of propositions concerning the relationships between firms/industries in the process of innovation and special considerations of relationships where both parties are located within a national framework (cf. ch 3):
(e) Even if many interfirm/interindustry relationships are of a flexible character, there exist a subset of relationships which are relatively stable. Such relationships function as information-channels and may have a semi-institutional character. (f) The transfer of preliminary learning results (relevant to innovation) normally takes a semi-formal or informal character. To a large degree this transfer takes place in some of the relative stable interindustrial channels. These channels connect innovative producers and their "lead users" (Hippel, 1988) . (g) Information channels tend to have a life history which makes them less and less suited for innovative communication. Because of this rule, the recreation or new creation of information channels is central to the type of innovative performance which is heavily dependent upon contanct between producers and lead-users. (h) The intranational relationships are normally better than the international relationships as means of transferring semi-formal and informal information. 8 By "better" we mean that the transfer is not as strongly filtered and disturbed in intranational as in international channels. 9 Provided that different units placed in the 8 This proposition is especially designed with respect to small, homogeneous nations. A more general formulation may start with: "Innovative relationships are often created within a relatively homogeneous environment, especially within national borders." 9 The reason is that national culture and informal networks help to provide, e.g., the degree of "interface protocols" which are needed for making the information flow suited for supporting the learning and innovation of the receiver. national context have innovatively relevant information to exchange, and provided that their communication channels have not matured, then an innovative advantage may be obtained. 10 (i) The creation of new channels of the innovative type most easily takes place between members of a national production system. Thus the national framework may help to develop a creative response to new international conditions (and even to a new techno-economic paradigm). 11 (j) Differences with respect to the character and amount of national linkages between producers and lead-users lead to differences in overall competitiveness of nations (cf. proposition (d)).
Such kinds of propositions are closely related to some of the core concerns of the book (see chs. 1 and 3). They are partially drawn from the "stylized facts" of our investigations into the Scandinavian socio-economic evolution (including the agroindustrial case). At the same time they provide a central element to the understanding of NSI. However, since they are treated elsewhere in the book, they are presented in a condensed form in the present chapter.
Development blocks and their structural tensions
We are now prepared to return to the discussions on growth pole analysis (section 3) and to the question of how the different elementary propositions fit together in an approach which is at the same time structuralist and evolutionary. To see this we will discuss some concepts of how things hold together in a sequence of evolutionary steps or, perhaps, a cascade of events. This becomes especially clear at the border of the approach, at the times of when parts of the specialization structure of a nation cannot be taken for grated and "jumps" take place. Here we will consider the interaction of jumps and more regular phenomena in terms of Dahmén's (1950 Dahmén's ( , 1988 idea "development blocks." But we are clearly relating to growth pole analysis, to Hirschman's (1958) idea of an inducement of entrepreneurship and (innovative) investment decitions through the backward and forward linkages from a particular innovative step and Scitovsky's (1954) two concepts of external economies (technological and pecuniary).
When moving from the automatic and continuous learning outcomes of a given setup to more and more radical "jumps," we are approaching the "ideal type" of innovative entrepreneurship in the classical Schumpeterian sense. However, even Schumpeter say the autonomous innovation of the entrepreneur as followed by less conspicuous, induced innovations, and induced innovations are in turn inducing other innovations. If we follow 10 Not even multinational corporations are able to provide a similar framework for many types of innovative contacts. this immediate network of related innovations (not including those related to the increase in general demand) we have a "block of development," to use a term of Dahmén (1950 Dahmén ( /1970 Dahmén ( , 1988 . The borders of this "block" is quite vague so a notion of "clusters of innovative investment projects" may be more appropriate. However, we follow Dahmén and talks in terms of "development blocks" which combines a Schumpeterian "push" with a Schmooklerian "pull" of innovation.
The idea of "development blocks" relates to well-documented phenomena discussed in techno-economic history but it has not been easy to cope theoretically with the idea. In this respect it resembles other notions of an interaction of jumps and more regular phenomena, like "growth poles" (see section 2 above), Hirschman's (1958) idea of an inducement of entrepreneurship and (innovative) investment decisions through backward and forward linkages from a particular innovative step and Scitovsky's (1954) two concepts of external economies (technological and pecuniary). The difficulty is not only due to the basic problems surrounding the notion of innovation but also often to the fact that the notion of innovation is discharged altogether while one is still talking of "development blocks," "growth poles," etc. This was the case when growth poles was studied in terms of input-output analysis.
The whole discussion leans heavily on the Schumpeterian analysis of two "ideal types" of economic decision-making related to innovative entrepreneurship and the administration of given possibilities. The two related strategies may be termed the Cartesian and the Stochastic Strategy (Allen, 1988) . The first strategy leads to calculations with reference to a set of economic values which are supposed to represent the experiences of a more or less stationary, non-evolutionary economy. This kind of investment decisions are clearly irrelevant to actors who are trying to make a profit by doing something radically new. Here is needed an ex ante calculation which cannot fully refer to the ex post evaluations of earlier projects. If the actors who are dealing with this kinds of decisions refer to the old routines, their projects will appear non-successful and these routines are, furthermore, related to "vested interests" who are partly hostile to the new projects. To judge whether there is a possibility of making a profit through a radical break with these routines implies a short-cut through the fundamentally non-computable aspects of the analysis of the investment. Here the innovator is referring to a new system of economic values which in part is only existing in his own head. This is the reason why innovative projects involve a good deal of gambling and "animal spirits."
The propositions presented in section 5.2. may help develop an analysis from such foundations. On the other hand, the ideas of Dahmén et al. may help to combine the structural level and the actor level of analysis more clearly than it has been done in sections 11 Often it is not given which types of relationships are necessary to cope with a new situation. Provided that the nation contains a broad set of advanced producers and possible "lead users," there 4 and 5. This combination leads to a set of new propositions (plus extra definitions) which represent a reinterpretation of earlier discussions on the disequilibrium dynamics development blocks, based on new results on networks and evolutionary processes:
(k) The establishment of a development block takes place in a context where there are some adaptable branches and/or certain traditions of entrepreneurship. The thinking about the evolution of the development block presupposes that the initial state of the system is relatively well-defined, even if it is not possible to define it in terms of general equilibrium. (l) The establishment of the core of the development block can then be seen as bringing into the system a jump in the degree of disequilibrium, starting a sequence of structural tensions and their partial resolutions (Dahmén, 1988) . In other words, the core innovation creates directly and indirectly a whole set of new niches, some of them are filled by chance or by innovative jumps. 12 (m) The development block is not only discernible ex post, as certain relationships between historically recorded innovative activities in related (supplier or customer) branches, but also ex ante, as an element of the investment calculus of the pioneering innovators (Schumpeterian entrepreneurs). The conception of a "development block" in relation to investment decisions does not necessarily become confirmed by ex post accounting but it clearly influences real activities. 13 (n) Since the types of structural tensions related to development blocks are often more radical than the ones related to interactive learning and incremental innovation, propositions (h) and (i) cannot be directly applied in this case. However, the "innovative response" to structural tensions often presuppose the same kind of informal information. Thus there are special opportunities for solving the tensions between the parties within the national framework ex post. Furthermore, there are special opportunities for an ex ante acknowledgement of the effects of resolving potential tensions and for including such a resolution in the innovative investment decision.
(o) The existence within a national economy of development blocks which are at the same time "immature" and well-established will strengthen its overall competitiveness and "development power" (cf. propositions (d) and (j)).
It is clear that the core concept in the above propositions is that of "structural tensions" and their temporary resolution. It is this concept which presupposes a possibility of defining an initial "equilibrium" with a certain degree of resolution of tensions. On this background it is possible to consider a sequence of structural tensions and their partial resolutions. Or, in Dahmén's (1988, 6) words: "Uncompleted blocks are are good possibilities of exploiting the national context innovatively.
12
The notion of development blocks may throw some light on the functioning of "technology systems" and "techno-economic paradigms" (Freeman and Perez, 1988, 46 f) , even if the pervasive effects of the latter seems far from Dahmén's original concept. 13 However, even if the ex ante notion of a development block a factor behind microlevel decisions, it is probably of limited relevance for macroplanning and industrial policy. This importance discussion, which e.g. is taken up by Hirschman and Lindblom, 1971 , cannot be dealt with here.
usually indicated by price and cost "signals" on various markets. This could mean low current profits-or even losses-in some areas but also promising prospects, if the steps necessary to complete the blocks are within reach. Less anonymous impulses may also come from actors in economic life, where, as we know, there are widespread networks of relations and contacts outside what theoreticians call a "market." In both cases the challenge is in "gap filling" which tends to eliminate structural tensions but may also lead to new tensions by overshooting, as technical and other solutions sometimes run ahead of the immediate goal."
These formulations may appear to be applicable to the interactions between producers and lead-users but the idea of "gap filling" is mainly relating to more radical innovations. Especially we should emphasize that the decisions to make "gap filling" are by no means automatic. This can be seen from Dahmén's (1988, 5) example of a development block from the classical history of the British textile industry with the sequence of innovations running from weaving to spinning and back to weaving during a 50-year period. However, it may be relevant to connect to more recent and less conspicuous examples.
The discussions on a "generalized" type of the "product life cycle" may give an idea of why "gap filling" is no simple matter. To see this we should not only emphasize the original innovation implied by the introduction of a new product on the market but also the related cluster of minor innovations which follows this primary innovation. This idea has been developed by, e.g., Utterback and Abernathy (see figure 4.3.) who relates to a typical (but by no means general) sequence of innovations and structural tensions. Source: Utterback and Abernathy (1978, etc.) .
According to the present interpretation of figure 4.3. we find in the beginning of the history of a major new product or a branch of industry structural tensions between users's needs and producers's production of the product. This "transformation problem" between the attributes of the product conceived by different users and the production characteristics confronting the producers is more or less solved through a series of debuggings and introductions of new product features. If this series of tensions finds a relatively stable solution the structural tensions are rapidly transferred to the interface between producer's and their suppliers of intermediate goods and production instruments.
Here we find a "transformation problem" which is in many ways similar to the first one.
A series of tensions and solutions may end up with a relatively balance between the vertically related links in the production chain. But a new tension may also build up due to overfilling of the "gap" or new tensions in the next step of the chain. However, the pioneering spirit around the development block is to a large extent dependent on supernormal growth rates in demand and investment and supernormal profits. And they cannot hold forever. Overall techno-economic evolution will sooner or later move the centre of entrepreneurial interest to another area.
Structural tensions may also be discussed in terms of innovation decisions. In the Schumpeterian universe there is basically two types of actors: the innovative entrepreneurs who try to create changes and the actors who passively adapt to changed situations or go out of business. Similarly the problem of "gap filling" can be seen from two points of view. First, we have the innovator who may try to take into account the subsequent "gap filling" (innovations and investments by other parties) when judging the profitability of his own innovation. He might even involve in broader areas of the development block. Thus Schumpeter (1939, 319) points out that in the last century in the US "a railroad [company] opened a region, built elevators, prepared many things for the would-be farmer, sometimes even furnished instructions about products and methods." This clearly points to a notion of an ex ante development block which is part of the expectations and even planning around an innovation.
Second, we have the case where an innovation is already introduced and a structural tension is revealed somewhere in the related vertical chain of production and use. Thus the introduction of railways created huge profits in many related branches and pointed at innovative possibilities. In this way the development block revealed itself ex post facto. But in this situation the pioneers among the "gap fillers" had to take a chance, relate their calculations to guesses and not only old routines and fight "vested interests" who ware partly hostile to the new projects. In other words, much "gap filling" is more or less innovative and involve a kind of gambling. Thus there is in Schumpeter's and especially in Dahmén's universe a twilight zone between innovation and routine activities which seems to be of special interest for the discussion of NSI.
Finally, we have the situation where the gap has been filled out. Even here there are investment decisions which appear like the ones from the period of tension since from a formal point of view all investment decisions are alike. However, acording to the Schumpeterian interpretation a radical transformation is taking place. The innovative entrepreneurs are becoming "mere managers" and this is an irreversible process. We have already said much about the rationale of this "absorbing state" in the Markov chain:
closure of conflicts, economy of information and thought, etc. But there is also an element of succession between the different stages in the life of a personality's and an organization: the "years of sacred fertility" is over. Fortunately, there is a chance that "new men and new firms" enter the stage. Another possibility (Schumpeter Mark II) is that large corporations try to internalize both roles. This possibility is included in some of the models of Nelson&Winter where the routine preservation state of a firm is left if and when it encounters strong pressure on its profitability. This combination seems somewhat arbitrary and far from general and we may remark that the routine-innovation dilemma remains partially unsolved both in theory and in practice (ch. 5).
Let us try to develop the sketched argument at the national level. Here we ask whether the overall "business situation" is characterized by a whole set of immature but strong development blocks (where new innovative opportunities continue to pop up) or whether the dominant development blocks have reached a state of saturation and, perhaps, overaccumulation. The first situation implies a positive "transformation pressure" upon the national economy while the second situation sooner or later implies forced adaption or "creative destruction."
With such a description of the "business situation" with respect to innovation, adaption and destruction, it is possible to evaluate macroeconomic policies through Schumpeterian eyeglasses. The basic industrial dynamics may, e.g., explain an economy's response to exchange rate policies. If the basic "development power" of the NSI is strong, then the economy will be able to respond strongly and innovatively to an undervalued currency while this is not possible in a saturated economy. One might think of the Japanese as opposed to the British experiences. But it is perhaps more interesting to compare Sweden (where a whole set of development blocks appears to became relatively mature during the 1960s) and Finland (where maturation occurred much later) Such examples give many possibilities for studying the different effects of, e.g., devaluations and monetary and fiscal policies in different "business situations" (Dahmén, 1988) . For example, we have the Swedish model of economic policy, including a promotion of industrial transformation through a squeezing of profits in the weak sectors and labour market flexibility. This model was developed in a situation with strong "development power" but later it seemed less appropriate.
There is, however, another possibility of transforming the micro-and meso-oriented discussion of development blocks to macro-economic performance. This involves an argument for semi-permanent sectoral strongholds of NSI may be interpreted in terms of innovative tensions between two sectors which are not just "filled" but also recreated due to, e.g., a continued technological revolution in the national capital goods sector or longterm and strong world market pressures upon the consumer goods sector. In this way there may be certain interfaces in the national system of production and innovation which may be able to uphold an immature and pioneering spirit for relatively long spans of time.
In discussing this possibility we have to work on a higher level of aggregation than in the case of ordinary development blocks. Thus we speak of relations between of overall departments of production which are defined in terms of means of production and means of consumption etc. We may, e.g., deal with departments for the production of capital goods, intermediate goods and consumer goods but each of these may be further subdivided according to the different types of users of their products. Furthermore, we may talk of the sector providing public services (see ch. 7). At this level of aggregation the possibility of misunderstandings and mixed assumptions becomes even greater than what we have seen above. However, it is sometimes convenient to aggregate the firms and branches according to the major usage of their products and if the results are used with utmost care they may contribute to structure the analysis.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have formulated and discussed a set of propositions which seems to be defining a production and linkage approach to NSI. The purpose of this procedure is two-fold. First, it should help the reader to see the merits and limitations of the individual propositions and the approach as a whole. The questions will, e.g., be whether the propositions and the approach have any relevance and, if the answer is yes, which branches and countries and time periods they apply to. Second, the procedure may help making studies according to the approach, especially by avoiding a transformation from a universe of conditioned learning and innovation to a universe of automatically functioning learningand linkage-effects. Even the most simple cases of learning-by-doing should be treated with utmost care. The example of the confusion related to the neglect of this rule in the case of growth pole analysis should be a warning to the reader and create some interest in formulating the assumptions behind studies of NSI.
The propositions of the chapter may be divided into three groups. First we have a set of propositions which postulates the importance of production and linkage patterns for learning and innovation ((b), (c), (e) -(g), (k) -(m)). Together they point towards systems of innovation (SI) in relation to production and exchange. These propositions may be compared with the "chain-link model" of innovation by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) . In their terms I have explored the central chain of innovation or, in other words, the matching process between market potentials, product designs and processes of production. At some points this chain presupposes a supply of knowledge from research systems which may basically be preoccupied with other types of problems then the ones discussed above. Such knowledge is not always readily available and must then be developed in an interaction between the knowledge-users of the development block and producers of the R&D system (Lundvall, 1985, 53 ff) . But still one may in many branches (cf. Pavitt, 1984) see the basic chain of innovation as the primary and relatively independent process while the link to the R&D system is something of secondary importance. At least this is the historical experience and we have also given some indications why it will also be so in the future, although in a modified form. The propositions may help to keep the readers attention upon the production and linkage-related aspects of the process of innovation even if the very notion of NSI tends to draw interests in many other directions.
The second set of propositions ((h) -(i), (n)) postulates that national linkages are of importance for innovative performance at the micro-or meso-level. To many this idea is provoking but it should not be forgot that it is implicitly present in many arguments around NSI. The emphasis upon the importance of national linkage patterns for competitive advantage is part and parcel of the "do-it-yourself-economics" and technology-policymaking of international organizations, government offices, labour unions and many business firms. From this background it enters into semi-popular arguments like Cohen and Zysman, Manufacturing Matters (1987) and Porter, Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) . In these (and some, more narrowly academic) works there is an emphasis on "[t]he nature of home demand for an industry's product and service" and " [t] he presence or absence in the nation of supplier industries and related industries that are internationally competitive" (Porter, 1990, 71 ).
The present framework is intended to help making such ideas more precise and to judge their possibilities and limitations. This is especially important with today's internationalization of technology, communications and decision-making procedures and the related question of the future importance of the national production and linkage pattern for NSI. Judged from the communications revolution and the development of a more or less international business culture, one should suppose that the propositions on the importance of intranational relationships become of less importance in the future. But the propositions try to persuade the reader to consider countervailing forces which may indicate that diminishing importance of NSI is not developing through an irreversible process. Some intranational information channels are loosing their importance while others may develop as implied by the discussion of the life cycles of innovative relationships and development blocks. Furthermore, the studies of NSI have especially been concerned with their more conspicuous and mature parts which are at the point of loosing importance. For example, the study of information technology (IT) has apparently left its interest in the informal and "localized" phase of different "Silicon valleys" and acknowledged the increased international communication and decision making. But can we be sure that new breakthroughs in IT-applications will not be locally and nationally based?
The third set of propositions ((a), (d), (j), (o)) postulates that the processes within nationally bounded SI are of importance for overall national performance. These propositions have been included for reasons of completeness but they have only been dealt with in the passing (see part III for further evidence). Thus there is at present no room for evaluating different national technology policies in the context of the production and linkage structure approach to NSI. However, it should already be clear that policy analysis should be performed with at least the same care as academic studies in the area. The confusion created by the neglect of the assumptions of growth pole analysis was just as much related to (regional and developmental) policy analysis as to theoretical and econometric studies.
If the propositions presented in the chapter is judged to be relevant, the question is which tools are available for conducting studies and discussions in the direction indicated.
The negative answer is already given: tools like Leontiev's (static) input-output analysis and Arrow's growth model with automatic learning effects are not sufficient and may be misleading. This verdict also covers a whole set of similar tools, including the ones of Pasinitti (1981) and Thirlwall (1986) . The argument is not that we should abandon such tools (discussed in Andersen, 1990 ) but that they should not be allowed to stand alone.
What is missing are tools which are usable for expressing some of the basic Schumpeterian or evolutionary insights. The chapter has tried to persuade the reader that the analytic and model's builder tools of Nelson&Winter (1982) are higly relevant, even in relation to the complex processes of the state-transformation of a national economy. In this connection NSI may be defined as one of the forces which influence the behavioural rules and the search space which, in turn, is a partial determinant of the sequence of changes in the production routines and the product routines of firms. This remains a proposal backed by a few examples but there are clearly many possibilities (see, e.g., Gerybadze, 1982) .
The chapter is basically analytic. However, the policy perspectives should not be forgot in a period where "new windows of opportunity" may for a while open up for many countries (Perez and Soete, 1988) . Sooner or later major new "niches" created by the new IT-oriented techno-economic paradigm will be occupied and the production pattern may regain its fixed character. In the meanwhile ideas of learning, lead-users and development blocks may help to avoid the total dominance of one-sided prophecies of the "Decline and Fall of National Systems of Innovation." There are also some room for a study of the "Raise, Fall and Possible Resurrection of National Systems of Innovation."
At least it is my impression that nations and not least the national production and linkage structures have still a role to play in promoting the "development power" of nations and the world as a whole.
